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In this paper, I consider several issues related to the concept of iden-
tity—the concept that is in many ways related to Heda Festini’s early 
philosophical interests. I specifi cally focus on discussion of the issues in 
Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein. I contrast two competing conceptions 
of identity—the objectual (according to which identity is a relation in 
which every object stands only to itself) and the metalinguistic (accord-
ing to which identity is a relation between coreferential names)—and 
consider reasons these authors had for accepting or discarding one or 
the other. In addition, I consider how issues concerning identity relate to 
issues concerning identity statements.
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1.
In 1992 Heda Festini published a book Uvod u čitanje Ludwiga Witt-
gensteina [An Introduction to Reading Ludwig Wittgenstein], covering 
in an introductory yet novel way major themes in Wittgenstein’s philo-
sophical development, from early Notebooks to his late On Certainty. 
In the course of that, she payed a particular attention to issues that 
occupied her own thinking over the two previous decades, from mid 
1970ties onward. The fi rst of the issues concerns the connection be-
tween Wittgenstein’s analysis of language-games and linguistic mean-
ing as based on use, and Dummett’s and Hintikka’s semantic concep-
tions, as well as their antirealist inclinations (see e.g. Festini 1985, 
1986/1987, 1988/1989). The second one concerns Wittgenstein’s earlier 
semantic insights, and his implicit or explicit exploitation and explora-
tion of Fregean sense/reference (or, more generally, intension/exten-
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sion) distinction, particularly in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and 
writings of the middle period (see e.g. Festini 1976/1977, 1978, 1982). 
Festini’s book was never intended to be a complete, overall exposition of 
Wittgenstein’s ideas, of course, and a number of his ideas—even those 
closely related to her primary interests—she never discussed. Among 
them is Wittgenstein’s (2001) criticism of the traditional, “objectual” 
conception of identity (according to which it is a relation in which every 
object stands to itself and no other object), and his elimination of the 
identity sign from conceptual notation (i.e. logic) altogether.
Naturally, the issues concerning identity were not only in Wittgen-
stein’s focus. They were of considerable interest to his predecessors—
Frege and Russell—whom early Wittgenstein identifi ed as central fi g-
ures affecting his thought (Wittgenstein 2001: 4). Indeed, Wittgenstein 
explicitly identifi ed Russell’s (and Whitehead’s 1927: 22, 57, 168) defi -
nition of identity as the primary target of his criticism (Wittgenstein 
2001: 5.5302). But most of his critical remarks concern other related 
conceptions as well. Russell (2001: xviii) initially thought it is “a de-
structive criticism from which there seems no escape”, but subsequent-
ly changed his mind, seeing it instead as “invalid” and “mistaken” 
(Russell 1959: 115).
The defi nition of identity Russell and Whitehead proposed in Prin-
cipia Mathematica clearly relates to Frege’s views on identity.1 Indeed, 
they all fall within the “Leibnizian” tradition that in one way or an-
other exploits the indiscernibility of identicals principle, which Leib-
niz formulated as: “Things are the same as each other, of which one 
can be substituted for the other without loss of truth” (Frege 1980a: 
76; 1984: 200).2 In addition, Wittgenstein’s more positively oriented re-
marks about identity in Tractatus—what identity would amount to if it 
turned out not to be eliminable—bare similarities to Frege’s treatment 
of identity in Conceptual Notation. Wittgenstein, for example, writes 
(2001: 4.241): “When I use two signs with one and the same meaning, 
I express this by putting the sign ‘=’ between them. / So ‘a = b’ means 
that the sign ‘b’ can be substituted for the sign ‘a’.” Both of them, at 
the time, would say that identity is a matter of linguistic conventions, 
rather than a sterile objectual relation. It would be a relation between 
names of objects provided they are coreferential, rather than objects 
themselves; call this the “metalinguistic” conception.
1 The peculiarity of Russell’s and Whitehead’s defi nition—x = y =def. “F (F!x → 
F!y)—steams from their hierarchisation of functions (generally, drawn to avoid 
various antinomies), the defi nition appealing only to the predicative functions. So, 
they insist: “We cannot state that every function satisfi ed by x is to be satisfi ed by y, 
because x satisfi es functions of various orders. And these cannot all be covered by one 
apparent variable” (1927: 168; see also p. 57). Wittgenstein (2001: 5.5302) pointed to 
an addition problem with that feature of Russell’s and Whitehead’s defi nition, but in 
what follows, I will not consider it further.
2 In fact, the tradition would be more accurately labelled “Aristotelian”; see 
Kneale and Kneale (1962: 42).
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The concept of identity was of considerable interest to Frege, and 
Frege’s insights about it made a considerable impact on Russell (and 
Wittgenstein), as well as on Dummett and Hintikka. In turn, Witt-
genstein and the latter two infl uenced much of Festini’s thinking over 
the two decades. And if one adds to all that that the intensional/ex-
tensional distinction is typically defi ned in terms of the unrestricted 
substitutivity that stems from identity, the concept of identity seems to 
be an appropriate theme for a paper included in a collection dedicated 
to Festini.
2.
In The Principles of Mathematics, Russell summarised much of the 
basic worries surrounding the concept of identity of the period from 
Frege’s Conceptual Notation and “On Sense and Reference” to Wittgen-
stein’s Tractatus. He writes:
The question whether identity is or is not a relation, and even whether 
there is such a concept at all, is not easy to answer. For, it may be said, iden-
tity cannot be a relation, since, where it is truly asserted, we have only one 
term, whereas two terms are required for a relation. And indeed identity, 
an objector may urge, cannot be anything at all: two terms plainly are not 
identical, and one term cannot be, for what is it identical with? Nevertheless 
identity must be something. (Russell 1992: 63)
Here, as in many other related passages of that period, the worry starts 
as a metaphysical one. Russell asks, does identity exist, and, if it does, 
what is its nature. Immediately, however, the discussion becomes a 
semantic one—the focus now being on “where it [identity] is truly as-
serted” rather than on identity itself. The reason is obvious. If one 
limits himself strictly to metaphysical issues, the claims with which 
one end up are either largely uninformative, trivial, and impotent, or 
plainly contradictory, or even nonsensical. Namely, all one can say is 
that identity is a relation in which every object stands to itself and 
no other object, and then specify properties of that relation, such as 
refl exivity, symmetry, and transitivity; or one can start by saying that 
two objects, a and b, are identical only if some conditions Ψ are met. As 
Wittgenstein (2001: 5.5303) puts it, “to say of two things that they are 
identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with 
itself is to say nothing at all”. Wittgenstein (2001: 5.53, 5.533) him-
self thought that this is a suffi cient reason to abandon the concept of 
identity altogether, and to eliminate the identity sign from conceptual 
notation. In the reformed language, according to him, the identity of 
an object would be expressed by the identity of its name rather than 
an identity statement. That means that no two objects would bare the 
same name, and no single object would bare two (or more) of them. 
Not too many philosophers followed Wittgenstein on that point (see 
Ramsey 1990 for an exception). For, even if one forms a language free 
of the identity sign, thus carrying no information about identity, to 
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square mathematical and ordinary language within it would come with 
a high price to pay. For most philosophers, then, the feeling remained 
that there is more to identity than a mere tautological description, that 
it goes beyond contradictory statements about it, and that it is a genu-
ine phenomenon that needs to be explained, not eliminated. To cope 
with the feeling, one naturally turns to ways we talk about, or express 
identity in ordinary language, and then try to come up with a plausible 
explanation of the phenomenon based on the semantic analysis of rel-
evant statements.
A clear example of such a strategy can be found in the opening pas-
sage of Frege’s “On Sense and Reference.” Frege (1960: 56) too starts 
with a metaphysical worry: “Equality gives rise to challenging ques-
tions which are not altogether easy to answer. Is it a relation? A rela-
tion between objects, or between names or signs of objects?” But, in-
stead of offering a straightforward answer to these questions based 
on whatever considerations one would classify as metaphysical, Frege 
turns to considerations of identity statements. Afterwards, nowhere is 
his paper does he deals with the fi rst question (although his second 
question strongly suggests the answer), and the second dilemma is 
settled explicitly only negatively: Neither option is acceptable to Frege 
because neither can explain the relevant phenomena concerning the 
identity statements. This Frege’s point, I think, is based on the confu-
sion of metaphysical and semantic (and epistemological) issues. The 
rest of Frege’s paper deals exclusively with the latter issues, although 
the way he opens his paper, as well as the way he concludes it, suggests 
he deals with the former.
So, immediately after posing the questions about the nature of 
identity, Frege turns to consideration of identity statements. He dis-
tinguishes statements of the form “a = a” (e.g. “Cicero is Cicero”) from 
statements of the form “a = b” (e.g. “Cicero is Tully”). The distinction, 
however, is not made on the ground that they have different form (see 
also Frege 1972: 124). Rather, Frege (1960: 56) insists, the distinction 
should be made because “a = a” and “a = b” differ in cognitive value: 
“a = a holds a priori and, according to Kant, is to be labelled analytic, 
while statements of the form a = b often contain very valuable exten-
sions of our knowledge and cannot always be established a priori”. This 
feature of identity statements—particularly statements of the form “a 
= b”—Frege suggests, supports the view that identity is a relation be-
tween names of objects. To say that Cicero is Tully, for example, is to 
say that names “Cicero” and “Tully” designate the same object.
Given the general English conventions about functioning of prop-
er names and the verb “is” (interpreted as identity)—namely, what a 
competent English speaker tacitly knows when correctly using these 
expressions—from the fact that the sentence “Cicero is Tully” is true 
there follows that names “Cicero” and “Tully” designate the same ob-
ject. And it certainly comes as a discovery to learn that a person bears 
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another name, and what that other name is—a discovery one cannot 
know a priori unless he stipulatively introduced that other name into 
discourse.3 Accordingly, a statement expressing that circumstance can-
not be analytic. I know, for example, that “Lady Gaga”, “Lil’ Kim”, and 
“Nicki Minaj”, are names of Lady Gaga, Lil’ Kim, and Nicki Minaj, re-
spectively, and I strongly suspect that these are not the only names of 
these singers. But only after some googling, I discover what names they 
bear in addition, and that Lady Gaga is Stefani Germanotta, that Lil’ 
Kim is Kimberly Jones, and that Nicki Minaj is Onika Maraj. Given all 
that, the proposal that the difference in cognitive value be explained by 
appeal to metalinguistic information sounds appealing.
3.
Frege embraced the metalinguistic conception of identity, and for the 
similar reasons, in Conceptual Notation (Frege 1972: 124–126; 1960: 
56). There, instead of the standard identity symbol “=”, Frege intro-
duced a novel symbol, “”, that stands for the identity of content of sym-
bols placed on the left and the right of it, and explained it as follows 
(Frege 1972: 124): “Identity of content differs from conditionality and 
negation by relating to names, not to contents. Although symbols are 
usually only representatives of their contents […] they at once appear 
in propria persona as soon as they are combined by the symbol for iden-
tity of content, for this signifi es the circumstance that the two names 
have the same content.”
Frege’s “” is more general in application than “=”. It can be com-
bined with symbols with which “=”, strictly taken, cannot, as long as 
these symbols have a (conceptual) content.4 And, combined with the 
double judgment stroke, it serves to Frege as the indicator of abbrevia-
tive defi nition (Frege 1972: 126, 167–168).5 Other than that, there is 
no difference, and it would be wrong to conclude that Frege intended 
to use “” in addition to “=” (for the latter symbol is used nowhere in 
the concept script). Nor should one think that Frege intended to elimi-
3 For a discussion about the possibility of knowing a priori truths that are 
otherwise known a posteriori, see e.g. Kripke (1980: 63). Frege (1972: 167–168), and 
Russell and Whitehead (1927: 168), thought that such stipulative or abbreviative 
defi nitions are not identity statements on the par with “Cicero is Tully” or “Hesperus 
is Phosphorus”.
4 In his latter writings, Frege treated both singular terms and sentences as 
proper names of objects, so all such expressions could, from that perspective, fl ank 
the standard identity sign, and in his writings they do.
5 Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica distinguished three senses of 
Frege’s “”—as identity, equivalence, and abbreviative defi nition—by representing 
them formally using different signs, namely, the identity sign “=” (1927: 22–23), the 
equivalence sign “” (1927: 7), and the defi nition sign “= Df”, which is to be taken 
as a single symbol, rather than as composed of two symbols, the identity sign and 
“Df” (1927: 11). Wittgenstein (2001: 4.241, 5.101) followed Russell and Whitehead 
in that respect.
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nate “=” in any signifi cant sense; certainly not in Wittgenstein’s (2001). 
The symbol “” is merely broader in application, and free of whatever 
unwanted burden “=” might bring for a reader into the concept script 
from mathematics and ordinary use, the burden which in Conceptual 
Notation Frege was eager to avoid. Therefore, wherever “=” would be 
used, “” could be used as well (but not vice versa). In its literal use, 
“Snow is white = Snijeg je bijel” would make little sense, but “Snow 
is white  Snijeg je bijel” would be perfectly fi ne.6 And that there is a 
need for such a symbol, with the intended metalinguistic interpreta-
tion, Frege demonstrates using a geometrical example where “A” and 
“B” ultimately name the same fi x point on the circumference of a circle 
around which a straight line rotates, and concludes (Frege 1972: 126) 
“that different names for the same content are not always merely an 
indifferent matter of form; but rather, if they are associated with dif-
ferent modes of determination, they concern the very heart of the mat-
ter. In this case, the judgement as to identity of content is, in Kant’s 
sense synthetic”. So, the point is the same as in the previously quoted 
passage—statements of the form “A  B”, just as the earlier ones of the 
form “a = b” are always synthetic, and, at least sometimes known a 
posteriori.
Frege subsequently become dissatisfi ed with the proposed concep-
tion of identity. The problems he saw with it in “On Sense and Refer-
ence” are not fully clear, but it seems that his main point was that, if 
interpreted metalinguistically, “the sentence a = b would no longer re-
fer to the subject matter, but only to its mode of designation; we would 
express no proper knowledge by its means” (Frege 1960: 56). That most 
likely means that, e.g., the discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus is 
not a linguistic discovery about the coreference of names “Hesperus” 
and “Phosphorus”. Rather, it is an astronomical discovery about a plan-
et that goes beyond linguistic conventions of English. And the above 
proposed conception of identity apparently fails to capture that fact. So, 
even if the English sentence “Hesperus is Phosphorus” in some sense 
implies that names “Hesperus” and “Phosphorus” designate the same 
thing, it is certainly not what that sentence primarily, or literally, says. 
Apparently, then, Frege became dissatisfi ed with his early conception 
of identity for the same reason he was dissatisfi ed with formalist treat-
ments of arithmetic. Just as numerals are not a proper subject-matter 
of arithmetic, so names are not a proper subject-matter of identity 
statements (see e.g. Frege 2013: ix). Russell and Whitehead (1927: 67) 
gave a similar objection to metalinguistic reading of identity state-
ments. Their complaint was not, however, that such reading changes 
6 An example of a nonstandard use of “=”, the one that appeals to our pragmatic 
intuitions, and which is defi ned nowhere in the book, can be found in Russell and 
Whitehead (1927: 138), where, for example, they interpret the proposition “p” as “p 
= Socrates is a Greek”, and the propositional function “fx” as “fx . = . x is a Greek”. 
These are certainly not identity statements, and, as it seems, they are not worthy of 
being labelled defi nitions.
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the subject matter of identity statements, but rather their truth condi-
tions, because part of truth conditions of any such statement would be 
that a certain object be called a certain name—but the truth of such a 
statement cannot depend on that feature.7
Of course, one can think of a number of other problems with the pro-
posed conception of identity. The crucial one is that no matter how the 
thesis is ultimately spelled out, it will always presuppose the compet-
ing objectual conception of identity. Just consider Frege’s two variants 
of metalinguistic defi nition of identity, namely “the symbol A and the 
symbol B have the same conceptual content” (Frege 1972: 126), and 
“the signs or names ‘a’ and ‘b’ designate the same thing” (Frege 1960: 
56). Both defi nientia contain the phrase “the same”, which must be 
interpreted in terms of the objectual identity relation. And an alterna-
tive metalingusitic defi niens, namely, “the object named ‘a’ is identical 
to the object named ‘b’” (Frege 1960: 78), faces the problem even more 
obviously. It follows, then, that any such metalinguistic defi nition of 
identity presupposes the objectual identity, and so, whatever it merits 
would be, it could not be its alternative, but, at best, a supplement. But, 
in the light of the above objection, should one even consider keeping the 
metalinguistic defi nition? One reason would certainly be to keep it not 
as the defi nition of identity, but rather as the explication of the con-
tent or truth conditions of identity statements. That would certainly be 
compatible with Frege’s (1972, 1960) reasons to consider it in the fi rst 
place. Nevertheless, one would still face Frege’s initial objection.
The problem of presupposing the objectual identity could be avoided 
if the concept of identity occurring in defi niens would be interpreted 
metalinguistically as well, but only at the cost of either the circularity 
of the defi nition or leading into the infi nite regress. Russell most likely 
had that in mind when he noted that Frege’s early take on identity is “a 
defi nition which, verbally at least, suffers from circularity” (1992: 502). 
Later, Frege made a related point when he wrote: “Since any defi ni-
tion is an identifi cation, identity itself cannot be defi ned” (Frege 1984: 
200). So, the problem of circularity would be double here: Not only does 
the defi niens appeal to the very concept it should defi ne, but the very 
defi nition of identity—whatever form it may take—is itself a case of 
identity statement, and as such it presupposes the concept. It is far 
from clear, however, that Frege’s defi nition would be circular in the 
second sense. Namely, by defi ning the concept of identity of content, 
Frege is in fact not describing a previously established concept and de-
termining the meaning of its familiar symbol. Rather, he introduces a 
novel symbol and stipulates its meaning, thus bringing a new concept. 
And, given the way he understood such stipulative defi nitions, it is far 
from clear that they are the case of identity statements. Also, to what 
7 They originally made that point for cases with defi nite descriptions, but the 
point goes for other singular terms as well. For a similar objection see Kripke (1980: 
108).
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degree Frege’s concept overlaps with the familiar concept of identity 
might—with respect to the problem of circularity—be irrelevant. I will 
return to that issue in section 5.
If identity in general cannot be properly defi ned, since every defi ni-
tion of identity has the form of identity statement, and if, in addition, 
identity cannot be a relation between names, since that would commit 
us either to accept the objectual identity, or it would lead us into circu-
larity and infi nite regress, it seems that one has no choice but to grant 
that identity is an indefi nable relation between objects. But that option 
Frege found equally unsatisfi ed. For him, the same thing that supports 
the metalinguistic conception—namely, the informativeness of identity 
statements of the form “a = b”—undermines the objectual conception. 
If identity would merely be a relation in which every object stands to 
itself and no other object, “a = a” and “a = b” would say the same thing, 
and would thus differ only in form. But that is obviously not the case. 
For Frege, there is more to identity than that.
4.
The conclusion of the opening passage of “On Sense and Reference” is 
that neither of the two mentioned options is the acceptable one. And, 
as far as identity goes, the concept is further discussed nowhere in the 
paper. The ultimate conclusion of the passage is only that “a difference 
[between statements ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’] can arise only if the difference 
between the signs [‘a’ and ‘b’] corresponds to a difference in the mode of 
presentation of that which is designated”. This tells us nothing about 
identity itself. And the rest of the paper is merely an elaboration and 
extension of this conclusion. Indeed, Frege’s closing passage in the pa-
per seems misleading on that matter. He writes:
Let us return to our starting point. / When we found ‘a = a’ and ‘a = b’ to 
have different cognitive values, the explanation is that for the purpose of 
knowledge, the sense of the sentence, viz., the thought expressed by it, is no 
less relevant than its reference, i.e. its truth value. If now a = b, then indeed 
the reference of ‘b’ is the same as that of ‘a,’ and hence the truth value of ‘a 
= b’ is the same as that of ‘a = a.’ In spite of this, the sense of ‘b’ may differ 
from that of ‘a’, and thereby the thought expressed in ‘a = b’ differs from 
that of ‘a = a.’ In that case the two sentences do not have the same cognitive 
value. (Frege 1960: 78)
The passage is misleading because Frege’s starting point was the ques-
tion about identity, not identity statements, and these are two different, 
although related thing. Frege does not provide any metaphysical view 
about identity in spite of his initial metaphysical question. Instead, he 
offers a semantic analysis of identity statements, based on the sense/
reference distinction.
To make an analogy: It is one thing to ask, for example, do proposi-
tional attitudes exist, and, if so, are they relations, what (if anything) 
they relate, etc. These are metaphysical issues. It is quite another thing 
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to ask what propositional attitude reports, namely sentences reporting 
subject’s particular attitude, typically say, what are their truth condi-
tions, etc. The metaphysics of propositional attitudes one embraces at 
the outset might help in forming the semantic analysis of attitude re-
ports with which one will ultimately end up. Just as it might turn out 
that the semantic analysis of attitude reports one embraces will ulti-
mately determine the way one understands attitudes themselves. Nev-
ertheless, these are two different issues that should not be confl ated. 
The same goes for identity and identity statements (and virtually any 
other metaphysical issue that fi nds its counterpart in semantic discus-
sions concerning the accompanying vocabular; just think of universals 
or time).
In addition, the last quoted passage contains another problematic 
point. Recall, in the opening passage of the paper, we are left only with 
the negative answer to the question whether identity is a relation be-
tween objects or between names of objects. And now, given the intona-
tion, it seems that Frege is at least hinting which of the two options 
he accepts when he writes “[i]f now a = b, then indeed the reference 
of ‘b’ is the same as that of ‘a’”. But what option is that? On the closer 
inspection, one fi nds that this formulation is ambiguous, and that it is 
compatible with either of the two options, since, on the par with Frege’s 
(1980a: 69) transformation of numerical statements of the form “x has 
N ps” into identity statements of the form “the number of x’s ps is (iden-
tical to) N”, one could transform Frege’s two formulations of the meta-
linguistic defi niens, namely, “the symbol A and the symbol B have the 
same conceptual content” (Frege 1972: 126), and “the signs or names 
‘a’ and ‘b’ designate the same thing” (Frege 1960: 56), into formulations 
resembling the above ones, namely: “the conceptual content of the sym-
bol A is the same as that of B” and “the thing designated by the sign of 
name ‘a’ is the same as that of ‘b’”. In fact, Frege in Conceptual Nota-
tion at one point, refl ecting on his geometrical example demonstrating 
the informativeness of identity statements, writes that “the name B 
has the same content as the name A” (1972: 125).
Nevertheless, given the way Frege appeals to identity in The Foun-
dations of Arithmetic and his other writings after Conceptual Notation, 
one could have little doubt about which concept of identity he embraces. 
It is the plain objectual concept according to which identity is the rela-
tion in which an object stands to itself and no other object.8 For him to 
8 Frege slipped into the metalinguistic interpretation even after Conceptual 
Notation: “[…] ‘the number of Jupiter’s moons is the number four, or 4’. Here ‘is’ has 
the sense of ‘is identical with’ or ‘is the same as’. So that what we have is an identity, 
stating that the expression ‘the number of Jupiter’s moons’ signifi es the same object 
as the word ‘four’.” (Frege 1980a: 69). Apparently, such an interpretation comes 
naturally. Similarly, Kripke, a clear opponent of the metalinguistic interpretation 
(see Kripke 1980: 107–108), at one point in his book writes that “sometimes we may 
discover that two names have the same referent, and express this by an identity 
statement” (Kripke 1980: 28, my italics). Pace Kripke, we would more likely express 
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embrace the alternative formulation would be redundant, since in his 
later writings the phenomenon of informativeness is explained by ap-
pealing to senses, rather than modes of designation that he introduced 
with his early conception of identity. So, given the way the argumen-
tation in the initial passage of “On Sense and Reference” is set, Frege 
should not have objected to the objectual view of identity that it cannot 
account for the alleged difference in cognitive value, because the view 
was never intended to be such an explanation. Instead, he should have 
said that although identity is a relation “in which each thing stands to 
itself but to no other thing” (Frege 1960: 56), identity statements, at 
least those of the form “a = b”, convey information that goes beyond 
that metaphysical dictum; hence the difference in thoughts expressed 
by “a = a” and “a = b”. Keeping that in mind, the issue Frege is particu-
larly concerned with is whether the information identity statements 
involve is: (a) information about names fl anking the identity sign, and 
their semantic conventions—ways of designation; (b) information about 
the object in question that is given in different ways, independently of 
the way it is designated; or (c) merely the information about the self-
identity of an object.
All three options, and not just (c), plainly presuppose the objectual 
view of identity. Indeed, one would think, it seems impossible to side-
step the objectual view since it is incorporated into the very way we 
think about objects and the way they are related. So, is there more to 
be said about identity?
5.
Frege and Russell in principle agreed on many points concerning the 
concept of identity. For one thing, both of them appealed to identity 
statements and their informativeness to point out the need for a se-
mantic analysis that goes beyond mere reference of relevant expres-
sions. Frege thought that it strongly supports his sense/reference 
distinction, Russell (1992: 63) took it as crucial for the semantics of 
descriptive phrases (see also Russell and Whitehead 1927: 23). Also, 
both of them accepted Leibniz’s indiscernibility of identicals principle 
as the fundamental law governing identity, perhaps even its defi ni-
tion. Thus, in The Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege (1980a: 76) writes: 
“Now Leibniz’s defi nition is as follows: ‘Things are the same as each 
other, of which one can be substituted for the other without loss of 
truth’. This I propose to adopt as my own defi nition of identity”. In 
Conceptual Notation (Frege 1972: 161–162), and later in Basic Laws of 
Arithmetic (Frege 2013: 36), Frege introduced variants of the principle 
as one of the axioms (or basic laws) of the logical system, and Russell 
and Whitehead (1927: 23) write: “If x and y are identical, either can 
this with the statement “‘a’ and ‘b’ are coreferential”. “a” and “b” would not be used, 
but only mentioned.
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replace the other in any proposition without altering the truth-value 
of the proposition.”
Taken at face value, the principle of indiscernibility of identicals, be 
it a defi nition or merely “a principle that brings out the nature of the 
relation of identity” (Frege 1984: 200), or “a fundamental property of 
identity, from which remining properties mostly follow” (Russell and 
Whitehead 1927: 23), it makes no sense. Firstly, the plural “things”, 
the phrase “each other”, and similar, are in obvious confl ict with the 
very idea of identity, for no two (or more) things could ever be identical 
with each other. Secondly, even if this awkward wording is ignored, the 
idea that things are substituted is just as bad: Where exactly would we 
substitute a thing, and, for any given thing, for what other thing should 
it be substituted, and truth of what could be lost? A way to make some 
sense from at least a part of that formulation would be to say that prop-
ositions, rather than sentences, are primary truth bearers, that objects 
are their constituents, and so that one substitutes objects within propo-
sitions. The problem with that would obviously be that whenever iden-
tity holds for whatever object—and, by defi nition, it always holds for 
every object—no other object could be substituted for it on the ground 
of identity. Thus, if anything is substituted in such cases, it is certainly 
not an object entering the identity relation.
If one is to make any sense of Leibniz’s indiscernibility of identicals 
principle, at least a fundamental revision of its formulation is needed. 
Frege did not address this issue explicitly, but the way he immediately 
utilised it, suggests that he most likely was aware that in its original 
form it makes no sense. Thus, in the same paragraph, Frege writes:
Now, it is actually the case that in universal substitutivity all the laws of 
identity are contained. / In order, therefore, to justify our proposed defi ni-
tion of the direction of a line, we should have to show that it is possible, if 
line a is parallel to line b, to substitute “the direction of b” everywhere for 
“the direction of a”. (Frege 1980a: 77)
Similarly, Russell and Whitehead (1927: 23) start with the formula-
tion: “[i]f x and y are identical, either can replace the other […]”, but 
just a passage below continue: “[identity] can only hold between x and 
y if x and y are different symbols for the same object”. They clearly talk 
fi rst about identity as an objectual relation—since, taken as objects in 
their own right, “x” and “y” are defi nitively not identical—and symbols 
“x” and “y” are used to represent objects.9 But then they switch to meta-
linguistic mode, mentioning these symbols in the passage that follows. 
Taken in conjunction, the quoted section makes little sense. And they 
obviously did not intend to accept the metalinguistic conception, since, 
a bit further, they explicitly criticise it (Russell and Whitehead 1927: 
67).
9 Throughout Principia Mathematica one fi nds a number of places that support 
that reading, e.g., in their phrase “the objects which are identical with x”. Here, “x” 
stands for an object, and it is not a disguised name of the symbol “x”.
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If Leibniz’s defi nition is to be interpreted (or rephrased) in the light 
of the quoted passages, it is clear that it is not a thing that is substitut-
ed, but rather its name, that it is substituted for another name it bears, 
and that the substitution takes place in a sentence. In that case, the 
truth of a sentence in which it occurs is preserved.10 So the defi nition 
would now be: a is identical to b only if a’s name “a” can be substituted 
for (its other) name “b” in a sentence without the loss of its truth. But 
this could hardly be taken as a defi nition of identity; if it were, what 
would it tell us about it? Rather, we already have to possess the concept 
of identity to make sense of such a formulation. Subsequently, Frege 
become dissatisfi ed with Leibniz’s defi nition of identity because it, or 
any other defi nition of identity, would be circular (Frege 1984: 200): 
“Leibniz’s explanation […] does not deserve to be called a defi nition 
[…] Since any defi nition is an identifi cation, identity itself cannot be 
defi ned”.
6.
Now, if we consider this Frege’s remark in the light of his earlier dis-
tinction between plain identity statements and abbreviative defi ni-
tions, he obviously thinks that identity is a concept we already possess 
(see also Frege 1980a: 74), and can subsequently only describe. It is not 
a concept we introduced by a defi nition. Thus, a defi nition of identity 
would itself be an identity statement on the par with “Cicero is Tully”. 
Russell and Whitehead (1927: 11, 57) took a different course, writing 
as if identity—at least in the context of their formal system—is intro-
duced stipulatively, and thus that its very defi nition is not an iden-
tity statement. Its defi nition, just as any other defi nition in Principia 
Mathematica, according to them, would be normative—“the expression 
of a volition”—rather than descriptive; it “is concerned wholly with the 
symbols, not with what they symbolise”; and it is neither true nor false, 
since it is not asserted (1927: 11). But, as far as the defi nition of iden-
tity goes, their view seems problematic, since it is far from clear that 
the defi nition if identity is such a defi nition. If that is so, one should 
side with Frege’s ultimate conclusion, namely, accept that no defi nition 
of identity is possible. At best, one could end up with its “informative 
analysis” that would explicate its features. Pace Wittgenstein (2001), 
it should be observed that, even if one could build a formal language 
devoid of the identity sign, one could hardly square ordinary and math-
ematical language within it. And if the latter ones are the phenomena 
one should explain, rather than explain away, a suffi ciently strong for-
mal system for that purpose should certainly keep the identity sign 
with its preestablished use, and the concept of identity lurking behind 
it.
10 For the sake of simplicity, I ignore here the issue of intensional sentences, i.e., 
the problem some such sentences pose for unrestricted substitutivity.
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